Abstract
In early June 1955, negotiations opened in London on the normalization of relations between the USSR and Japan, which were severed in August 1945 in connection with the outbreak of the Soviet-Japanese war. They were led by Ambassador Ya. A. Malik and Member of Parliament, former diplomat S. Matsumoto. Instead of confining the negotiations to the task of restoring diplomatic relations, the Soviet side for some reason got involved in long and unpromising discussions on the territorial issue, which did not bring it and, most importantly, by definition could not bring any dividends, and caused and continue to cause only an unnecessary headache both in the months-long dialogue with Tokyo in 1955-1956, and throughout all subsequent decades up to the present day. But an even more unforgivable and gross strategic miscalculation was made by Soviet diplomacy in August-September 1955, when, on behalf of Moscow, Malik first hinted and then openly promised the Japanese to cede the disputed islands of Shikotan and Habomai in return for their agreement to conclude a peace treaty with the USSR, which recognized his sovereignty over the entire Great Kuril Ridge from Kamchatka to the Japanese island of Hokkaido, and above all on the two southern, also disputed islands - Kuna-shir and Iturup. This concession to Moscow was completely meaningless and empty, just a gratuitous gift to Japan, because under no circumstances could it bring the desired results to the Soviet leadership. It could not, not only because of Tokyo's unwillingness to be satisfied with such a small handout, but above all because of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 with Japan, which was not signed by the Kremlin, which essentially prohibited it from granting the USSR any greater advantages over the parties to the treaty in the course of a subsequent peace settlement.
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